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 Susan Haack
 Peirce and Logicism:
 Notes Towards an Exposition*
 My damned brain has a kink
 in it that prevents me from
 thinking as other people think.
 [C.S. Peirce]1
 1. Introduction:
 Was Peirce a logicist? If one has to give a simple answer, cer-
 tainly it must be "no;" but the issue is sufficiently far from
 straightforward that a simple answer is not fully adequate. How
 far from straightforward the issue is might be illustrated by the
 fact that Murphey opens chapter XII of The Development of
 Peirce fs Philosophy with a discussion of Peirce's objections to the
 logicist position as represented by Dedekind, but closes chapter
 XIII with the observation that "[i]n spirit. . . Peirce has more in
 common with the logicistic school than with in tuition ism."2 He
 makes no comment about the apparent tension.
 In fact, the evidence seems to be that, though staunchly oppos-
 ing one characteristic logicist thesis, Peirce sympathized with an-
 other. Since the two theses appear to stand or fall together, as
 Frege assumed they did, this raises some, intriguing questions,
 both exegetical and philosophical. In hopes that here, as else-
 where, there may be something important to be learned thanks to
 the "kink" in Peirce's brain, I offer in this paper my (preliminary,
 and pretty tentative) attempt to spell out something of his con-
 ception of the relation of mathematics to logic.
 2. Background: Peirce's knowledge of logicism:
 There is no reference to logicism in the indices to the Collected
 Papers? nor in the indices to the first four volumes of the Chron-
 ological Edition f nor in the indices to the New Elements ofMathe-
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 mattes.5 Only in his discussions of Dedekind, whom he mentions
 at 4.239 (1902) as holding that "mathematics is a branch of log-
 ic" - a thesis Peirce immediately rejects - does he come even close
 to an explicit discussion of logicism.
 Frege recognized Dedekind as having anticipated the logicist
 view, writing in the Grundgezetze that "Herr Dedekind, like my-
 self, is of the opinion that the theory of numbers is part of logic,"
 but went on to say that Dedekind 's work "hardly contributes to
 [this opinion's] confirmation" because it is insufficiently rigor-
 ous.6 But there is no reference to Frege in either the Collected Pa-
 pers or the New Elements, and the few references in the Chrono-
 logical Edition are all to the editors' introductions, not to Peirce 's
 text. Peirce must have known something of Frege 's work;
 Schroder sent him a copy of his review of the Begriffsschrifft, and
 Christine Ladd listed this review and the Begriffsschrijft itself in
 the bibliography of her paper, "On the Algebra of Logic," in the
 Studies in Logic published by members of the Johns Hopkins Uni-
 versity and edited by Peirce.7 I conjecture that Schroder's on the
 whole hostile review, and especially his claim that, apparently in
 ignorance of Boole's work, Frege was effectively just transcribing
 his calculus of judgements in a clumsy new notation, may have
 disinclined Peirce to take any further interest in Frege 's work.8
 Peirce reviewed Russell's Principles of Mathematics in 1903, but
 the review amounts only to a cursory paragraph; Murphey conjec-
 tures that Peirce may not actually have read the book at the time
 he wrote the review.9 Apart from this, all the references to Russell
 in the Collected Papers are supplied by the editors, as is the one
 reference in the Chronological Edition. The several references in
 the New Elements are all dismissive, the most notable describing
 Russell and Whitehead as "blunderers, continually confusing dif-
 ferent questions" (III/2, p. 785, 1906).
 But in their footnote to 3.43-4 (1876) Hartshome and Weiss
 comment on the affinity between Peirce 's definition of cardinals,
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
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 and that of Principia, Mathematica,. In the article on Peirce in the
 Dictionary of American Biography, P.W., referring to the same
 1867 paper, writes that Peirce "clearly anticipated the method for
 the derivation and definition of number employed in the epochal
 Principia Mathematica."™ And the same point is made in Eisele's
 Studies in the Scientific and, Mathematical Philosophy ofC.S. Peirce;
 Peirce, Eisele writes, anticipated "many of the ideas to be found
 in ... Principia Mathematica."11
 In the circumstances, the best strategy seems to be to begin by
 considering the characteristic theses of logicism, and investigating
 Peirce's attitude to those theses.
 3. Two Characteristic Theses of Logicism:
 Logicism comes in two versions: a narrower, concerning the re-
 lation of arithmetic to logic, and a broader, concerning the rela-
 tion of mathematics to logic. Frege 's logicism was of the narrower
 variety, Russell and Whitehead's of the broader.12 In either ver-
 sion, there are two theses central to logicism, one formal, the oth-
 er epistemological. The former is to the effect that all the special
 concepts of mathematics [arithmetic] are definable in purely logi-
 cal terms, and all the theorems of mathematics [arithmetic] are
 then derivable from purely logical principles. For short, this is the
 thesis that mathematics [arithmetic] is reducible to logic, to which
 I shall refer as (LI). Closely associated are the theses that the
 propositions of mathematics [arithmetic] are analytic, and (in
 Frege at least) that mathematical [arithmetical] objects are ab-
 stract, neither mental nor physical. The epistemological thesis of
 logicism is to the effect that because of the certainty or self-
 evidence of the logical axioms, the reducibility of mathematics
 [arithmetic] to logic explains the peculiar security, the a priori
 character, of mathematical [arithmetical] knowledge. For short,
 this is the thesis that the epistemological foundations of mathematics
 [arithmetic] lie in logic, to which I shall refer as (L2).
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 Frege took it for granted that (LI) and (L2) stand or fall to-
 gether:
 . . . arithmetic is a branch of logic and need not borrow
 any ground of proof whatever from experience or intui-
 tion. . . . Every axiom which is needed must be discov-
 ered ... it is just the hypotheses which are made without
 clear consciousness that hinder our insight into the epis-
 temological nature of a law.13
 And so, it seems, until he felt the need to hedge his bets about
 the rationale for the Axiom of Infinity, did Russell:
 The connection of mathematics with logic ... is exceed-
 ingly close. The fact that all mathematical constants are
 logical constants, and that all the premisses of mathemat-
 ics are concerned with these gives, I believe, the precise
 statement of what philosophers have meant in asserting
 that mathematics is à priori.1*
 But the textual evidence seems to indicate that Peirce sympa-
 thized with something like (LI) while resolutely opposing any-
 thing like (L2).
 4. Peirce' s sympathy with the first logicist thesis:
 In the second Lowell lecture of 1866 (CE 1, p. 386), Peirce
 writes that "mathematical demonstration can be reduced to syllo-
 gism;" by 1867 he is claiming much more than this, opening a
 paper entitled "Upon the Logic of Mathematics" thus:
 The object of this paper is to show that there are certain
 general propositions from which the truths of mathemat-
 ics follow syllogistically, and that these propositions may
 be taken as definitions of the objects under the considera-
 tion of the mathematician . . . (3.20; CE2, pp. 59-60)
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
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 What follows appears to be an attempted reduction of arithmeti-
 cal propositions to Boolean logic. And in the course of the paper
 Peirce presents a discussion of cardinal number which, as Hart-
 shorne and Weiss, P.W., and Eisele all remark, bears a striking af-
 finity with the definition offered, much later, in Principia Mathe-
 matica:
 ... let the letters, in the particular application of Boole's
 calculus now supposed, be terms of second intention
 which relate exclusively to the extension of first inten-
 tions. Let the differences of the characteristics of things
 and events be disregarded, and let the letters signify only
 the differences of classes as wider or narrower. . . . Thus
 n in another case of Boole's calculus might, for example,
 denote "New England States;" but in the case now sup-
 posed, all the characters which make those States what
 they are being neglected, it would signify only what es-
 sentially belongs to a class which has the same relations
 to higher and lower classes which the class of New Eng-
 land States has, - that is, a collection of six.
 In this case, the sign of identity will receive a special
 meaning. For, if m denotes what essentially belongs to a
 class of the rank of "sides of cube," then n = m will im-
 ply, not that every New England State is a side of a cube,
 and conversely, but that what ever essentially belongs to a
 class of the numerical rank of "New England States" es-
 sentially belongs to a class of the numerical rank "sides of
 a cube," and conversely. Identity of this sort may be
 termed equality. . . . (3.43-4; C£, 2, pp. 68-9)
 Peirce's first paper on the logic of relatives appeared in 1870.
 Subsequently, in a paper in which he returns to the relation of
 arithmetic to logic, and which opens:
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 Nobody can doubt the elementary propositions concern-
 ing number. . . The object of this paper is to show that
 they are strictly syllogistic consequences from a few pri-
 mary propositions . . . which I here regard as defini-
 tions . . . (3.252; C£, 4, p. 299, 1881)
 he observes that these "syllogistic" derivations will require the
 logic of relatives. It was of course also crucial to Frege's program
 that by developing a logic in which relations are expressible he
 overcame the difficulty which frustrated Leibniz's proto-logicist
 project, that arithmetic cannot be reduced to Aristotelian syllogis-
 tic logic because of the inability of that logic to represent rela-
 tions.
 At 4.88 (1893) Peirce points out how numerical propositions
 of the form "There are n Fs" may be "syllogistic conclusions from
 particular propositions;" for example, that from "Some A is B"
 and "Some not- A is B" it follows that there are at least two Bs.
 He continues (4.93) by remarking that "there are various ways in
 which arithmetic may be conceived to connect itself with and
 spring out of logic" - the way just indicated, and the ways de-
 scribed in the two earlier papers discussed above.
 A discussion somewhat misleadingly entitled "Synthetical Prop-
 ositions A Priori" (NEM, IV, pp. 82fF., 1892) insists that mathe-
 matical propositions either "define an ideal hypothesis (in the
 mathematical sense)" or else are "deductions from those defini-
 tions" (p. 82). To illustrate this, Peirce continues, he will "prove
 from definitions that 7 + 5 = 12." "Only an ignorance of the log-
 ic of relatives," he continues, "has made another opinion possi-
 ble."
 It certainly looks, in short, as if Peirce sympathized with some-
 thing much like (LI).
 The position with respect to the thesis, which for Frege and
 Russell is virtually identified with the logicist thesis I have called
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
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 (LI), that the truths of mathematics [arithmetic] are analytic, is a
 bit more ambiguous. In the paper of 1893 mentioned earlier,
 Peirce remarks that the way arithmetic springs out of logic "is suf-
 ficient to refute Kant's doctrine that the propositions of arithme-
 tic are 'synthetical'" (4.91), and goes on to criticize Mill's con-
 ception of arithmetical laws as very general empirical propositions.
 He is keen, however, to insist that "those who [like myself] main-
 tain that arithmetical truths are logically necessary" are not "eo
 ipso saying that they are verbal in their nature." Similarly, in the
 paper of 1892 in which Peirce offers his proof of "7 + 5 = 12"
 from definitions, he concludes that "the proposition in question is
 analytical or explicatory," but makes a point of adding, "but, no
 doubt, Kant had a very narrow conception of explicatory proposi-
 tions, owing to his knowing nothing of the logic of relatives"
 (NEM, IV, p. 84). A discussion of "essential predication" from
 1901 makes it clear that Peirce is uneasy about the way Kant's
 definition suggests that what is analytically true must be obvious:
 an essential predication is one where the predicate is contained in
 the essence of the subject, hence, analytic in Kant's sense; but,
 Peirce continues, neither Kant nor the scholastics realized that
 "an indefinitely complicated proposition, very far from obvious,
 may ... be deduced ... by the logic of relatives, from a defini-
 tion of the utmost simplicity ... ; and this may contain many no-
 tions not implicit in the definition" (2.361, 1901). In view of
 this, it is not so surprising that, by 1902, one finds Peirce denying
 that mathematical truths are analytic; of Kant's conception of
 mathematical truths as synthetic a priori, he remarks that it is
 true, at any rate, that "they are not, for the most part, what he
 called analytical judgements; ... the predicate is not, in the
 sense intended, contained in the definition of the subject"
 (4.232). I think there is no real contradiction here, only a verbal
 shift; Peirce holds, on the one hand, that mathematical truths are
 deducible from definitions, but insists, on the other, that this
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 does not mean that they are trivial, obvious, or merely verbal.15
 But it should already be apparent that Peirce should not be ex-
 pected to take (LI) to have the epistemological consequences
 which Frege and Russell supposed; for he is chafing against the
 distinction of analytic and synthetic. Mathematical truths straddle
 the usual distinction: they are not empirical generalizations, but
 necessary truths - necessary truths, however, discoverable by ob-
 servation of or experimentation on imagined diagrams.
 The position with respect to the other thesis closely associated,
 in Frege at least, with (LI), mathematical Platonism, is less
 straightforward yet.16 True, at 4.118 (1893) Peirce speaks of "the
 Platonic world of pure forms with which mathematics is always
 dealing," and in the prospectus for his 12-volume Principles of
 Philosophy (c.1893) he entitles the third volume, Plato's World: an
 Elucidation of the Ideas of Modern Mathematics.17 But at 4.161
 (c.1897) we read: "[the system of abstract numbers] is a cluster
 of ideas of individual things, but it is not a cluster of real things.
 It ... belongs to the world of ideas, or Inner World. But nor
 does the mathematician, though he "creates the idea for himself
 create it absolutely." This is pretty baffling until one reads, at
 6.455 (1908), "[o]f the three Universes of Experience ... the
 first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the
 mind of poet [or] pure mathematician . . . might give local
 habitation . . . " 18 The idea seems to be that the constructions of
 the mathematician actualize what already had the status of possi-
 bility, of firstness. So while in the earlier piece Peirce denied that
 numbers are real, i.e., independent of thought, he now writes that
 "the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting
 thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Re-
 ality." If this is Platonism, it is Platonism of a very distinctively
 Peircean stripe.19
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society \
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 5. Puree's repudiation of the second logicist thesis:
 Peirce's repudiation of (L2) seems almost completely unambig-
 uous. I say "almost" because of the following passage, the only
 one I have found that even appears to suggest any sympathy with
 (L2); it comes from chapter 7 of a ms "toward a logic book" of
 1872-3, entitled "Of Logic as a Study of Signs:"
 The business of Algebra in its most general signification is
 to exhibit the manner of tracing the consequences of sup-
 posing that certain signs are subject to certain laws. And
 it is therefore to be regarded as part of Logic. (CEy 3, p.
 83)
 What immediately follows, however, is an argument against "cer-
 tain logicians of some popular repute" (the editors remark, "the
 reference is almost certainly to W. Stanley Jevons") who claim
 that algebra is "inapplicable to logic." In view of this, and of the
 fact that a little later (p. 92) Peirce is found explaining how one
 bit of algebraic notation, "a - <b," may be interpreted as repres-
 senting "a is smaller than b" or "all a is b" or "b is a conse-
 quence of a, " the most plausible explanation of the passage quot-
 ed seems to be as insisting on the usefulness of algebraic
 notation to logic, not as claiming the epistemic dependence of al-
 gebra on logic.20
 Every other relevant text I have come across seems to indicate
 unambiguously that Peirce was strenuously opposed to the thesis
 that mathematics is founded epistemologically on logic.21
 For Peirce, it is Dedekind who represents the idea that mathe-
 matics is a branch of logic. Apparently Peirce's father was, at the
 time he was writing his Linear Associative Algebra^ attracted to
 something like this view; Peirce reports that he did his best to dis-
 suade him.22 And the other evidence of Peirce's repudiation of
 anything like (L2) is overwhelming. "We homely thinkers believe
 that . . . the safest way is to appeal for our logical principles to
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 the science of mathematics" (3.427, 1896). "It does not seem to
 me that mathematics depends in any way upon logic" (4.228,
 1902). "[L]ogic depends on mathematics" (4.240, 1902). "Math-
 ematics is not subject to logic. Logic depends on mathematics"
 (2.191, 1902). "Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but
 mathematics lays the foundations on which logic builds" (2.197,
 1902). [Mathematics . . . has no need of any appeal to logic"
 (4.242, 1902). "[T]rue mathematical reasoning is so much more
 evident than it is possible to render any doctrine of logic proper
 . . . that an appeal in mathematics to logic would only embroil a
 situation" (4.243, 1902). "[TJhere is no more satisfactory way of
 assuring ourselves of anything than the mathematical way of assur-
 ing ourselves of mathematical theorems. No aid from logic is
 called for in this field" (2.192, 1902). " [Mjathematics is almost, if
 not quite, the only science which stands in no need of aid from the
 science of logic" (2.81, 1902). "[T]here are but five theoretical sci-
 ences which do not more or less depend on the science of logic
 . . . the first is mathematics . . . Mathematics has no occasion to
 inquire into the theory of validity of its own arguments; for these
 are more evident than any such theory could be" (2.120, 1902).
 6. The explanation of Peirce's apparent sympathy with (LI) and
 repudiation of (L2) does not lie in the distinction between broad
 and narrow logicismi
 On the assumption that (LI) and (L2) stand or fall together,
 Peirce's position stands in need of explanation. One diagnosis that
 suggests itself, since the passages which indicate sympathy with
 something like (LI) seem to be concerned with the reducibility of
 arithmetic to logic, while the passages repudiating (L2) seem to
 be concerned with the epistemic priority of mathematics over log-
 ic, is that Peirce sympathizes with (LI) in the narrow interpreta-
 tion ("arithmetic is reducible to logic") but rejects (L2) in the
 broad interpretation ("the epistemic foundations of mathematics
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society -,
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 lie in logic"). There are a couple of complicating factors: Peirce
 dislikes the traditional division of mathematics into algebra and
 geometry: (1.283, 4.247, both 1903), and he sometimes uses
 "geometry," simpliciter, to refer to physical geometry (3.427,
 1896); nevertheless, this explanation can be decisively ruled out.
 Peirce's sympathy with (LI) does include its application to pure
 geometry. This is indicated by his observation at 3.526 (1897)
 that "for projective geometry, Schubert has developed an algebrai-
 cal calculus which has a most remarkable affinity to the Boolian
 logic;" and cf. 4.131 (1893) which describes Schubert's Calculus
 of Enumerative Geometry as "the most extensive application of the
 Boolian algebra which has ever been made . . . the classical trea-
 tise upon geometry as viewed from the standpoint of arithme-
 tic."23 But most decisive is this passage from the paper entitled
 "Synthetical Propositions A Priori," already cited above; where,
 after his proof of "7 + 5 = 12" from definitions, and his comment
 that this judgement is analytic (though not in quite Kant's narrow
 sense), Peirce continues:
 Some have been of the opinion that while arithmetical
 propositions are analytic, geometrical ones are synthetic.
 But I am certain they are all of the same character.
 (ITEM, IV, p. 84, 1892)
 7. The explanation of Peirce's apparent sympathy with (LI) and
 repudiation of (L2) does not lie in a simple change of mind:
 Another diagnosis that suggests itself, in part because the pas-
 sages I have cited that seem to bespeak sympathy with (LI) are
 generally earlier than those I have cited as indicating Peirce's re-
 pudiation of (L2), is that Peirce may have shifted from early logi-
 cist sympathies to a later disenchantment with this kind of ap-
 proach.
 This conjecture might be thought to be supported by the fact
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 that Peirce many years later described the paper of 1867 in which
 he claimed to show that arithmetical propositions are derivable
 syllogistically from definitions as, he trusted, "by far the worst I
 have ever written" (4.333, c.1905). But this is not decisive: for he
 continues by remarking that the paper was "founded on an inter-
 esting idea, worthy of a better development." (The context sug-
 gests that he thought his account of cardinals in that paper, the
 one so close to Principia Mathematica, could be improved; but it
 also indicates that by this time - 1905 - Peirce was firmly of the
 opinion that ordinals are primary, not cardinals.)24 In any case,
 for all his harshness about the 1867 paper, Peirce subsequently
 described the paper of 1893 which I have also cited as indicating
 sympathy with (LI) as the strongest he had ever written.25
 Another passage which might at first blush be thought to sug-
 gest a change of mind, where Peirce remarks that the "nearest ap-
 proach to a logical analysis of mathematical reasoning" was
 Schroder's statement of Dedekind's analysis in a logical algebra
 devised by Peirce himself, but that "the soul of the reasoning has
 even here not been caught in the logical net" (4.426, c. 1903),
 turns out, a few paragraphs later, to be only paving the way for
 the observation that the system of existential graphs, being dia-
 grammatic, represents mathematical reasoning better than any al-
 gebraic notation (4.429). 26
 Not only is there no decisive evidence of a change of mind;
 there is also pretty decisive evidence against it. At 4.90 (1893)
 Peirce expresses both sympathy with something like (LI) and in
 the same sentence antipathy to anything like (L2): "... the
 whole theory of numbers belongs to logic; or rather, it would do
 so were it not, as mathematics, prelogical^ that is, even more ab-
 stract than logic." And then there is also Peirce's reminiscence of
 trying to persuade his father against "the opinion that Dedekind
 long afterward embraced" (that mathematics is part of logic),
 which must refer to a time before the publication of Benjamin
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
 Winter 1993, Vol. XXIX, No. 1.
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 Peirce's Linear Associative Algebra in 1870 - which certainly
 seems to rule out treating Peirce's repudiation of (L2) as a late
 development.
 8. The explanation lies, at least in part, in an ambiguity in
 Peirce's use of "logic:"
 When Peirce remarks in the paper of 1893 (4.85ff.) discussed
 above that "there are several ways in which arithmetic may be
 conceived to spring out of logic," "logic" evidently means "for-
 mal deductive logic." But unlike Frege, who seems virtually al-
 ways to mean "formal deductive logic" when he writes of "logic,"
 Peirce uses "logic" in a whole range of ways, of which this is one
 of the narrowest. My present concern is not with Peirce's shift
 from an earlier conception of logic as a small part of semeiotic,
 the part dealing with the truth and falsity of sentences, to his later
 identification of logic and semeiotic.27 It is rather to point out
 that "logic," for Peirce, often has the broad sense of "theory of
 reasoning" (see e.g., 4.242, 1902); that deductive logic is only
 part of logic thus broadly conceived - the branch concerned with
 the theory of necessary reasoning; and that Peirce holds that for-
 mal logic is a branch of mathematics. At 4.228 (1902), for exam-
 ple, he writes that "all formal logic is merely mathematics applied
 to logic;" and at 4.240 (1902) that "[t]here is a mathematical
 logic, just as there is a mathematical optics . . . Mathematical log-
 ic is formal logic," but " [fjormal logic is by no means the whole of
 logic, or even the principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned a part of
 logic proper" (my italics). And sure enough, in the "Outline Clas-
 sification of the Sciences" of 1903 (1.180ÍF.) Peirce definitely ex-
 cludes "the mathematics of logic" from logic proper; the latter is
 classified as one of three normative sciences, the former as one of
 the sciences of discovery.
 Let "LOGIC" mean "theory of reasoning" and "logic" mean
 "mathematical formalization of necessary reasoning." The evi-
This content downloaded from 129.171.249.139 on Sat, 03 Nov 2018 19:29:11 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 46 Susan Haack
 dence considered thus far might now be reconstrued as indicating
 that Peirce holds that mathematics is reducible to logic, but denies
 that mathematics is epistemically subordinate to LOGIC. If logic
 is conceived as a branch of mathematics rather than as a branch of
 LOGIC, the appearance of tension can be banished. Certainly the
 distinction seems helpful when applied to a characteristic passage
 like this one:
 If there is any part of logic [LOGIC] of which mathe-
 matics stands in need, it can only be that very part of log-
 ic [logic] which consists merely in an application of math-
 ematics, so that the appeal will be, not of mathematics to
 a prior science of logic [LOGIC], but of mathematics to
 mathematics [logic]. (1.247, 1902)
 I conjecture, also, that the mature Peirce may tend increasingly
 to prefer to use "logic" in the broadest sense, and to regard for-
 mal deductive logic at most as only a small part of it, and eventu-
 ally as not part of it at all; and that he tends, understandably,
 therefore, more and more to downplay the importance of the re-
 ducibility of mathematics to logic, and more and more to stress
 the importance of the epistemic independence of mathematics
 from LOGIC. This would explain why the passages I found indi-
 cating sympathy with, as I put it, "something like (LI)" are most-
 ly early, and those indicating antipathy to "anything like (L2)"
 mostly later.
 But we are not yet quite out of the woods. If my diagnosis is
 correct, what Peirce denies when he denies that the epistemic
 foundations of mathematics lie in logic (which on my interpreta-
 tion means, "in LOGIC") is not after all what Frege or Russell
 would mean by the thesis that the foundations of mathematics lie
 in logic- for no such distinction as that between LOGIC and log-
 ic is appropriate in their case. But this obviously doesn't mean
 that there is no real disagreement here;28 what it means is that
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
 Winter 1993, Vol. XXIX, No. 1.
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 the real disagreement would be more perspicuously represented as
 follows: Peirce, like the logicists, sympathizes with the idea that
 mathematics is reducible to a formal deductive system, logic,
 which, however, they regard as distinct from and epistemically
 prior to mathematics, but which he does not; for Peirce's view is
 that mathematics requires no foundation, that it is epistemically
 more secure than anything that supposedly grounded it could be.
 Peirce's classification of logic as mathematics rather than LOGIC,
 to put it another way, can be seen as an expression of his convic-
 tion of the epistemic autonomy of mathematics. An examination
 of Peirce's reasons for that conviction supplies further motivation
 for this way of looking at it.
 9. Peirce's reasons for insisting on the epistemic autonomy of math-
 ematics-.
 After reporting how he argued with his father against the idea
 that mathematics is a branch of logic [LOGIC], Peirce continues
 by observing that "no two things could be more directly opposite
 than the cast of mind of the mathematician and that of the logi-
 cian . . . [T]he mathematician's interest in reasoning is as a means
 of solving problems . . . [T]he logician ... is interested in pick-
 ing a method to pieces and finding out what its essential ingre-
 dients are," a thought echoed at 4.533 (1906). Shrewd as these
 remarks are, however, they are insufficient to establish the epis-
 temic independence of mathematics from LOGIC. Indeed,
 Frege - who himself, though professionally a mathematician,
 seems to have had the logician's temperament par excellence - says
 much the same: "[mathematicians generally are indeed only con-
 cerned with the content of a proposition and the fact that it is to
 be proved. What is new in this book is ... the way in which the
 proof is carried out and the foundations on which it rests . . .
 [an] essentially different viewpoint . . ."29
 "The difference between the two sciences is far more than that
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 between two points of view," Peirce writes at 4.240 (1902); it is
 a matter of the classification of the sciences (4.134, 1891). Actu-
 ally, he says a "mere" matter of the classification of the sciences,
 but the "mere" here seems excessively self-deprecatory in view of
 the importance Peirce always attached to this classification. In all
 the several classifications of the sciences that Peirce devised, re-
 vised and re-revised throughout his life, it seems, mathematics is
 at the head, and logic occupies a subordinate position.30
 The business of logic (i.e., LOGIC), according to Peirce, is
 "analysis and theory of reasoning, but not the practice of it"
 (4.134, 1891). The connection with the epistemic priority of
 mathematics over LOGIC is clear when Peirce observes, in the
 context of a discussion of Dedekind, that mathematics is the sci-
 ence which draws necessary conclusions, LOGIC the science of
 drawing necessary conclusions (2.249, 1902). And "just as it is not
 necessary, in order to talk, to understand the theory of the forma-
 tion of vowel sounds, so it is not necessary, in order to reason, to
 be in possession of the theory of reasoning" - indeed, Peirce con-
 tinues, if it were, "the science of logic could never be developed"
 (4.242, 1902).
 Peirce insists on the epistemic priority of mathematics: "the saf-
 est way is to appeal for our logical principles to the science of
 mathematics, where error can only go unexploded on condition
 of its not being suspected" (3.427, 1896); "mathematics performs
 its reasonings by a logica utens it develops for itself, and has no
 need for any appeal to a logica Aocens" (1.417, c.1896); "if the
 mathematician ever hesitates or errs in his reasoning, logic cannot
 come to his aid. He would be far more liable to commit similar as
 well as other errors there" (4.228, 1902); "mathematics is the
 one [sic] science to which . . . logic is not pertinent; for nothing
 can be more evident than its own unaided reasonings" (7.524,
 undated). Notice how Peirce uses "evident" as a matter of de-
 gree; there is no suggestion that the truths of mathematics are
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
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 self-evident. The reasoning of mathematics is fallible, Peirce holds,
 but "there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
 anything than the mathematical way ..." (2.192, 1902).
 It is surprisingly difficult to figure out whether, when Peirce
 says that mathematics is the science which draws necessary conclu-
 sions, he means (1) conclusions which follow necessarily from
 their premisses, or (2) conclusions themselves necessary, or (3)
 both. The symmetry of Peirce fs remarks about the business re-
 spectively of mathematics and of LOGIC seems to call for the
 first answer, and so might his observation that mathematical truth
 is "hypothetical" - until one notices that he equates "hypotheti-
 cal" with "non-factual" (4.232, 1902), which suggests the third
 answer. This (the third interpretation) would not require one to
 attribute to Peirce the idea that all deductively valid reasoning is
 mathematics,31 and it accomodates his observation that, though
 LOGIC is, mathematics isn't a "positive" science (7.524, undat-
 ed), and his claim that "[mathematical] necessity must spring
 from some truth so broad as to hold not only for the universe we
 know but for any world that poet could create" (1.417, c.1896).
 At any rate, it is clear that Peirce conceives of mathematics as
 concerned with abstract structural hypotheses, its truths as apply-
 ing to all possible situations with a certain structure. And here lies
 an explanation of his belief in the epistemic autonomy of mathe-
 matics. The abstract structures about which mathematicians rea-
 son and on which they experiment are patterns which they them-
 selves construct, abstract, or, perhaps best, actualize; and this is
 why Peirce holds that mathematical reasoning, though fallible, is
 as secure as any reasoning could be. "[Mathematics does not re-
 late to any matter of fact, but merely to whether one supposition
 excludes another. Since we ... create the suppositions, we are
 competent to answer . . ." (2.191, 1902); "[in mathematical rea-
 soning] all pertinent facts would be within the beck and call of
 the imagination; and . . . nothing but the operation of thought
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 would be necessary to render the true answer" (4.232, 1902).
 Mathematicians may reason carelessly; but, though mathematics
 is, therefore, fallible, (4.233, 1902), no appeal to LOGIC could
 improve its security.
 10. Envoi:
 After Russell's paradox, Godel's incompleteness theorem, the
 proliferation of rival set- theories, the claim that set- theory is "pure
 logic" and "self-evident" is no longer plausible, and the epistemo-
 logical promises of the logicist program sound hollow. Here is
 Quine's verdict on logicismi "... mathematics reduces only to set
 theory and not to logic proper . . . the axioms of set theory have
 less obviousness and certainty to recommend them than do most
 of the mathematical theorems we would derive from them. More-
 over, we know from Gòdel's work that no consistent axiom sys-
 tem can cover mathematics even when we renounce self-evidence.
 Reduction in the foundations of mathematics remains mathemati-
 cally and philosophically fascinating, but it does not do what the
 epistemologist would like of it; it does not reveal the ground of
 mathematical knowledge . . ,"32 This sounds remarkably, does it
 not, like conceding that something like (LI) is true, but denying
 that anything like (L2) is defensible? Here, as so often, one might
 say, Peirce sounds ahead of his time.
 As historians of logic remind us, Peirce belongs to another tra-
 dition than the Frege-Russell-Whitehead line that came to pre-
 dominate.33 What I have offered here, though very far from a full
 account of Peirce's understanding of the relation of mathematics
 to logic, and further yet from a serious attempt to figure out
 what might be defensible in that account, is enough vividly to il-
 lustrate how Peirce's conceptions run obliquely to now-familiar
 dichotomies. Are mathematical truths analytic or synthetic? Peirce
 surprises us by replying: they are not descriptions of empirical
 fact, but neither are they merely verbal, nor obvious. Are mathe-
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society \
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 matical objects created or discovered by us? Peirce surprises us by
 replying: "the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of
 getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves
 their Reality." Does mathematical knowledge depend on experi-
 ence? Peirce surprises us by replying: mathematical knowledge,
 like all knowledge, is acquired by experience, but by inner experi-
 ence, by observation of and experimentation on imagined icons.
 Is mathematical knowledge certain? Peirce surprises us by reply-
 ing: it is fallible, because we may blunder in our reasonings, but it
 stands in no need of extra-mathematical warrant. Peirce's episte -
 mology of mathematics, neither logicist nor intuitionist,34 resist-
 ant to contemporary categories, could prove to be a valuable re-
 source.
 University of Miami
 NOTES
 *An abridged version of this paper was read at the conference of the So-
 ciety for the Advancement of American Philosophy, University of Califor-
 nia, Santa Cruz, March 1991. The paper had its origin in a discussion at
 the conference of the Society at Buffalo in March 1990, where Sleeper
 raised the question whether Peirce was a logicist, and Houser replied that
 he didn't see how anyone could suppose that he was; I went away to re-
 locate the passages which, I thought, would show that Houser was un-
 ambiguously in the right, but what I found convinced me that matters
 are, after all, more complex than I originally supposed. I wish to thank
 the many correspondents who made helpful comments on earlier drafts
 of this paper: Claudine Engel-Tiercelin, Luciano Floridi, Angus Kerr-
 Lawson, Kenneth Laine Ketner, Mark Migotti, Sidney Ratner, Richard
 Robin, Ralph Sleeper and, especially, Stephen Levy and Nathan Houser.
 1. Attributed to Peirce in Bell, E.T., The Development of
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 Mathematics, McGraw Hill, New York and London, first edition, third
 impression, 1940, p. 519. I owe the reference to Houser, "Peirce as Lo-
 gician/ p. 7 of his typescript.
 2. Murphey, Murray G., The Development of Peirce' s Philoso-
 phy^ Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1961; see
 pp. 229-30 and 287-8.
 3. Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers, eds. Hartshorne, C, Weiss,
 P., and Burks, A., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931-58
 (references by volume and paragraph number).
 4. Peirce, C.S., Writings: A Chronological Edition, eds.
 Fisch, M., Kloesel, C.J.W., Moore, E.C., Roberts, D.D., Ziegler, LA.,
 Atkinson, N.A., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982 - (ref-
 erences given as " CE" by volume and page number).
 5. Peirce, C.S., The New Elements of Mathematics, ed. Eisele,
 C, Mouton, the Hague and Paris/Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands,
 NJ, 1976 (references given as "NEM" by volume and page number).
 6. Frege, G., Grundgezetze der Arithmetik (1893); English
 translation by Montgomery Furth, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Univer-
 sity of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964, p. 4.
 7. See Fisch, M., "Peirce and Leibniz" (1972), in Peirce, Se-
 meiotic and Pragmatism, eds. Ketner, K.L. and Kloesel, C.J.W., Indiana
 University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1986, pp. 251-2 and 259 n.8.
 8. "With regard to its major content, the 'conceptual nota-
 tion' could be considered actually a transcription of the Boolean formula
 language. With regard to its form, though, the former is different beyond
 recognition - and not to its advantage. As I have said already it was with-
 out doubt developed independently - all too independently." - from
 Schroder's review (1880) of Frege's Begriffsschrift, in Bynum, T. Ward,
 ed., Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
 1972, p. 221. Frege himself, of course, held his system to be superior to
 Boole's, stressing especially the ambiguity of Boole's symbolism; see his
 "On the Aim of the 'Conceptual Notation'," (1882), in Bynum, pp. 90-
 100, and "Boole's Logical Calculus and the Concept- Script" and
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
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 "Boole's Logical Formula -Language and my Concept -Script" in Posthu-
 mous Writings, eds. Hermes, H., Kambartel, F., Klaubach, F., trans.
 Long, P. and White, R., University of Chicago Press, Chicago/
 Blackwell's, Oxford, 1979, pp. 9-46 and 47-52.
 9. 8.171; Murphey, The Development of Peirce' s Philosophy,
 p. 241. Houser informs me that Peirce returned to the Principles later,
 but the paper he began on it in 1912 was never finished.
 10. Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography,
 Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1934, volume 14, p. 400.
 11. Eisele, C, Studies in the Scientific and Mathematical
 Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, ed. Martin, R.M., Mouton, the Hague,
 Paris, New York, 1979, p. 12.
 12. "... the axioms of geometry are independent of ...
 the primitive laws of logic, and consequently are synthetic," Frege, G.,
 Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), English translation by Austin,
 J.L., Blackwell's, Oxford, second edition, 1974, p. 21e. "All traditional
 pure mathematics, including analytical geometry, may be regarded as
 consisting wholly of propositions about the natural numbers," Russell,
 B., Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, (1919), reprinted in Putnam,
 H. and Benacerraf, P., eds, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings,
 Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, first edition, 1964, p. 115.
 13. Frege, Grundgezetze> trans. Furth, p. 29. Cf. the follow-
 ing remarks from the Grundlagen, trans. Austin: "I hope I may claim in
 the present work to have made it probable that the laws of arithmetic are
 analytic judgements and consequently a priori. Arithmetic thus becomes
 simply a development of logic, and every proposition of arithmetic a law
 of logic, albeit a derivative one" (p. 99e); ". . .it emerged as a very
 probable conclusion that the truths of arithmetic are analytic and a prio-
 ri" (p. 118e). Dummett suggests {Frege: Philosophy of Language, Duck-
 worth, London, 1973, p. xv) that Frege's work is of central importance
 to contemporary philosophy because it shifts the focus from epistemology
 to logic and philosophy of language; this, in view of the epistemological
 motivation for Frege's logicist program (which Dummett himself virtually
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 acknowledges on p. xix) is seriously misleading.
 14. Russell, B., The Principles of Mathematics, (1903), sec-
 ond edition, W.W. Norton, New York, 1938, p. 8.
 15. Cf. Levy, S., "Peirce's Theoremic/Collorarial Distinc-
 tion and the Interconnections Between Mathematics and Logic," forth-
 coming, for an elegant conjecture connecting three senses in which, ac-
 cording to Levy, Peirce uses "analytic," with the distinction in his title.
 16. Frege is a platonist all right, but Russell's position is not
 so straightforward. While in the Principles of Mathematics (1903) he
 maintained a realist account of classes, by the time of "Mathematical
 Logic as Based on the Theory of Types" ((1908), reprinted in Logic and
 Knowledge, ed. Marsh, R.C., Allan and Unwin, London, 1956) he was
 maintaining the "no class" theory according to which classes are deemed
 to be logical fictions. Cf. Quine, W.V., "Russell's Ontological Develop-
 ment" (1966), reprinted in Theories and Things, Harvard University
 Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1981, 73-85.
 17. Murphey, The Development of Parce' s Philosophy, pp.
 238-9.
 18. Cf. NEM IV, p. 268, c. 1895, for another comparison
 of the mathematician and the poet.
 19. So I would prefer not to describe Peirce's position, as
 Kerr-Lawson does, as "weak Platonism," though I agree with him that
 Peirce would assign mathematical objects to a different category than reg-
 ular existents. See his "Benacerraf s Problem and Weak Mathematical Pla-
 tonism" and "Peirce's Pre-Logicistic Account of Mathematics," both
 forthcoming.
 20. It is worthy of note that Peirce primes, double primes
 and triple primes the " - < " ; evidently he is well aware of the difficulty
 potentially caused by an ambiguous algebraic symbolism, a difficulty
 Frege regarded as disastrous for the Boolean approach.
 21. But cf. Levy, "Peirce's Theoremic/Collorarial Distinc-
 tion and the Interconnections Between Mathematics and Logic;" he
 holds that Peirce's position on the epistemological thesis remained incon-
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 sistent, since he was aware that the activities of the mathematician in-
 clude, e.g,. the devising of hypotheses, which comes within logic [LOG-
 IC] in Peirce's conception.
 22. Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy \ pp.
 229-30.
 23. The editors give a reference to Schubert, Hermann,
 Katkul der Abzahlenden Geometrie, Leibzig, 1897.
 24. Peirce alludes to a definition of ordinals "which was
 substantially given by me in 1883;" the editors suggest that this may be
 a slip, that Peirce refers to 3.260ff., 1881. I wonder, however, whether
 the reference might not be to the paper of 1893, 4.85ff.. See also fh. 25
 below, and cf. Levy, S., "Peirce's Ordinal Conception of Number,"
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, XXII.6, 1986, 23-42, espe-
 cially his m. 10.
 25. Editors' note to 4.85 (1893) refers to "vol. 9, letters to
 Judge Russell/ as the source of this claim. I have been unable to find
 the remark in the letters to Russell published in NEM, so cannot supply
 a date. Can anybody help here?
 26. It may be asked whether Peirce mightn't have given up
 his sympathy with (LI) on learning of Russell's paradox. According to
 Murphey, however, there is only one reference to the paradox in all of
 Peirce's writings, and this is so late (1910) that a change of mind at this
 point would not supply the explanation we are seeking.
 27. This has been well documented by the editors of the
 Chronological Edition: see CE, 1, pp. xxii-xxiv, xxxii-xxxv; see also, of
 course, Fisch, Peirce} Semeiotic and Pragmatism, pp. 306, 319, 320, 323-
 4, 326, 338-41, 343, 350, 390-1, 396, 435-6. All I have to add is the
 observation that as early as 1873 there is a trace of the broader concep-
 tion in the title of a piece already referred to, "On Logic as the Study of
 Signs," CE, 3, pp. 82-4.
 28. This point is of more general interest, since it is often
 taken for granted that, if a term has a different meaning in each of two
 theories in which it occurs, the theories cannot be genuine rivals. Cf. the
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 section on "meaning- variance" in my "'Realism'," Synthese, 73, 1987,
 272-99 (but please ignore the discussion of realism vs nominalism earlier
 in this piece, which is mistaken).
 29. Frege, Grundgezetze, trans. Furth, p. 5.
 30. I rely on Kent, B., Charles S. Parce: Logic and the Clas-
 sification of the Sciences, Me Gill -Queen's University Press, Kingston and
 Montreal, 1987, chapter IV.
 31. Cf. 7.524, n.d.: "Pure deductive logic, insofar as it is re-
 stricted to mathematical hypotheses, is, indeed, mere mathematics" (my
 italics).
 32. Quine, W.V., " Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontolqgi-
 cal Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York,
 1969, p. 70.
 33. See, for example, Putnam, H., "Peirce as Logician,"
 Historia Mathemaùcae, 9, 1982, 290-301; Grattan-Guiness, I., "Bertrand
 Russell (1872-1970) After Twenty Years," Notes Ree. R. Soc. Lond., 44,
 1990, 2180-306, section 8.
 34. Intuitionists, of course, like Peirce, insist that mathemat-
 ics is not epistemically dependent on logic, but rather the reverse. But
 Peirce does not, as they do, pose any challenge to the legitimacy of the
 non -constructive parts of classical mathematics. And though Peirce envis-
 aged the possibility of a non-bivalent logic, his reasons are quite different
 from the Intuitionist. See Fisch and Turquette, "Peirce's Triadic Logic"
 (1966), in Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism, 171-83. Murphey was, I
 should note, quite correct in seeing Peirce's philosophy of mathematics
 as having some affinities with logicism and other affinities with Intuition-
 ism.
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